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The Contours of Involuntary Manslaughter – A Place for Unlawful Act by Omission 
 
A number of recent developments both in the academic literature and in case law1 have 
brought into focus  the contours of involuntary manslaughter as its topographical 
features emerge more clearly from the mist that has from time to time enveloped them 
during recent decades. In terms of academic commentary, the article by Findlay Stark2 
in the pages of this review has performed the valuable service of demonstrating that we 
are looking at a picture that might be described as twin peaks, those of unlawful act and 
gross negligence, rather than a longer ridge including a third protuberance,  “reckless 
manslaughter”,  which can now be  seen to have been merely a trick of the light. Where 
this article will slightly differ from Stark’s analysis however relates primarily to the 
question of whether there is any sort of gap between unlawful act manslaughter and 
gross negligence manslaughter into which any significant cases  may fall, in particular 
in relation to omissions.   
 
The lack of any gap  for  “reckless manslaughter” 
There is little point in reiterating the clear analysis in Stark’s article demonstrating that 
reckless manslaughter is not properly to be found in the case law and that in virtually 
all conceivable cases where manslaughter might be thought to be an appropriate verdict, 
either gross negligence or unlawful act manslaughter will be available 3 . The one 
possible exception in Stark’s discussion seems to be exemplified by the “School  Dinner 
                                                 
1 Recent case law has primarily concerned gross negligence manslaughter, in particular in elucidating 
and applying the “truly exceptionally bad” test – see R (Oliver) v DPP [2016] EWHC 1771 (Admin), 
Sellu [2017] 1 Cr App R 24 (349) and Bawa-Garba [2016] EWCA Crim 1841. See also Zaman [2018] 
1 Cr App R (S) 26 (177) in relation to proof of  breach of duty.  
2 “Reckless manslaughter” [2017] Crim.L.R. 763 
3 See also Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2018 para B1.36,  cited in support by Stark [2017] Crim. 
L.R.  at n124. 
example”4  where D, responsible for preparing school meals, deliberately omits to 
intervene where a pupil (V) unknowingly picks up a sandwich containing pine nuts to 
which D knows V is allergic, D foreseeing the risk of serious injury but not of death, 
which  occurs due to a particularly violent but rare allergic reaction.  
 
A number of observations can be made about this example. As Stark recognises, 
opinions may differ as to whether this ought to be manslaughter. It is also a somewhat 
artificial example in that one has to suppose D is aware of a risk of serious injury (but 
not of death) and the risk of death would not be obvious to the reasonable person in D’s 
shoes5. Given the widely publicised unpredictable effects of exposure of children to 
foods to which they are allergic, one might have thought that the obvious risks of 
allergic reaction would normally  be taken to include not just the perceived risk of 
serious injury but also  an obvious and serious risk of death. If the  risk of death is said 
to be not obvious,  and thus distinguishable  on the facts  from the perceived and obvious  
risk of serious injury, then this may persuade some that the case is not properly one of 
manslaughter. Certainly it would not be within gross negligence manslaughter and 
indeed Stark puts forward the situation as one which, being an omission, is not currently 
within unlawful act manslaughter either but which nevertheless  ought to be caught 
(somehow) by manslaughter.   It thus serves as a possible argument (although 
admittedly not his principal argument) for reforming the law by legislating for an  
offence of reckless manslaughter (which would cover the example), notwithstanding 
that he is clear such an offence cannot be said to exist at the moment. The argument 
that it ought to be manslaughter is partially based on the fact that there are self-evidently 
                                                 
4 Stark, “Reckless manslaughter” [2017] Crim.L.R. 763 at 778 
5 Otherwise it would be caught by gross negligence manslaughter.  
less culpable defendants convicted under unlawful act manslaughter, where they have 
committed a positive act and foresee  much lower levels of bodily harm, and therefore 
it is unfair to leave this School Dinner  case, where there is advertence to serious injury,  
outside manslaughter6.  
 
Even if one were to accept, which is perhaps not hard to do, that this case ought to be 
manslaughter either on consistency or other grounds, the assumption that it currently 
cannot be so because it is an  omission is less soundly grounded than is often thought. 
The principal authority is Lowe7  where D was convicted of an offence of wilful neglect 
under s 1(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 but, on appeal, this was not 
regarded as a sufficient basis to convict also of manslaughter. The case is regularly cited 
as the (pretty much lone) authority for the proposition that unlawful act manslaughter 
requires a positive act and that an omission will not suffice for the unlawful act 
(although it is has been roundly criticised8 as an unsatisfactory decision in this respect.) 
 
Revisiting  Lowe 
A closer examination of Lowe and the arguments before the court will show that the 
comments about omissions not being a sufficient unlawful act are effectively only 
obiter dicta and should not be taken to be authoritative and that the decision is readily 
explicable on a quite different basis. One also has to  bear in mind that the approach of 
the court in Lowe to the meaning of “wilful” in wilful neglect, essentially treating it 
                                                 
6 Stark, “Reckless manslaughter” [2017] Crim.L.R. 763 at 784 
 
7 1973 QB 702 
8 See in particular Andrew Ashworth’s editorial  in [1976] Crim LR  529, and again in Ashworth,  
Positive Obligations in Criminal Law,  p95 n56 and in  J Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal 
Law (Oxford:Oxford University Press) p295. See also  D.Ormerod and K Laird, Smith and Hogan’s 
Criminal Law  14th edn (Oxford:Oxford University Press) at 629. 
only as requiring voluntariness but not as requiring any mens rea as to consequences, 
has also subsequently been held  to be wrong in the House of Lords in  Shepphard9. 
The nature of the statutory offence being considered as the potential unlawful act in 
Lowe was very different from the typical unlawful  act offence which does require some 
degree of mens rea. 
 
To fully understand what was going on in Lowe it is necessary to set out the facts, the  
offences of which D was convicted at trial and how these were dealt with on appeal. D 
was of low average intelligence and living with Patricia Marshall, whose intelligence 
was described in the case as “subnormal” and with whom he had four children, of whom 
one had previously been taken into care.  D said he had no concerns about the health of 
the child until five days before its death when he had suggested to Marshall that she 
take it to the doctor and she said she had done so but the doctor was out although she 
had got some medicine.  Two days later he urged her again to take it to the doctor and 
later in the day she said she had, although it subsequently emerged that she had not 
done so, being unwilling to disclose its state of health lest the child  be taken from her 
as had happened with one of her previous children. Phillimore LJ on appeal contrasted 
her sentence of probation with D’s sentence of imprisonment (initially five years for 
manslaughter) and commented10  that “…she had set out deliberately to deceive him..” 
although going on to say “No doubt he was gravely to blame…”). 
 
At the trial before May J, D was charged with manslaughter and child cruelty (wilful 
neglect) and the jury convicted on both counts. On the wilful neglect charge, the trial 
                                                 
9 [1981] AC 394 
10 [1973] QB 702, at 709 
judge made references to it involving a subjective test but also referred to whether the 
defendant ought to have foreseen the consequences of his failure to call a doctor. On 
appeal it was argued for the appellant that the references to what he ought to have 
foreseen were inconsistent with the subjective test required by s.8 CJA 1967 and that it 
had to be shown that D had actually foreseen the likelihood of unnecessary suffering or 
injury to health. In contrast, the Crown successfully argued that there was no 
requirement of foresight and that if anything, the   direction was unduly benevolent to 
the accused by referring to what he ought to have foreseen. As Phillimore LJ put it11  
 
 “It did not matter what he ought to have foreseen as the possible consequences 
of his failure to call a doctor; the sole question was whether his failure to do so 
was deliberate and thereby occasioned the results referred to in section 1(1) of 
the Act”.  
 
This was effectively the same interpretation of wilful neglect (as Phillimore LJ himself 
recognised in a later passage of his judgement when discussing manslaughter) which 
Reg v Senior12 had been taken to establish although, as was subsequently pointed out in 
Sheppard,  the facts of Senior were  significantly different in that the accused in that 
case was fully aware of the likely consequences of his neglect. (As Lord Diplock 
pointed out in Sheppard13, the case of Senior was not really good authority for this strict 
liability interpretation which treated wilful as simply meaning deliberate in the sense of 
voluntary.) 
 
                                                 
11 [1973] QB 702, at 707 
12 [1899] 1 QB 283 
13 [1981] AC 394, at 407 
The strict liability interpretation of wilful neglect (wrongly) applied in Lowe is highly 
significant in understanding the court’s approach to the manslaughter count. The trial 
judge had put the manslaughter charge to the jury on two alternative bases.  Firstly on 
the basis that he had been grossly negligent (or “reckless”) and secondly on the basis 
that in any event,  if he was guilty of wilful neglect which accelerated or caused death, 
that was automatically manslaughter (as had also been the case in  Senior).  The jury 
found that there had not been gross (or “reckless” ) negligence  but convicted of 
manslaughter since they found him  guilty of the statutory wilful neglect offence and 
therefore it automatically followed it was manslaughter. The Court of Appeal quashed 
the conviction for manslaughter, the following paragraph in Phillimore LJ’s judgment14 
being generally taken to be the governing principle 
 
We think that there is a clear distinction between an act of omission and an act of 
commission likely to cause harm. Whatever may be the position with regard to the latter 
it does not follow that the same is true of the former. In other words, if I strike a child in 
a manner likely to cause harm it is right that, if the child dies, I may be charged with 
manslaughter. If, however, I omit to do something with the result that it suffers injury to 
health which results in its death, we think that a charge of manslaughter should not be 
an inevitable consequence, even if the omission is deliberate. 
 
A striking and significant feature of this clear distinction between act  and omission is 
that it comes virtually  at the end of the judgment and yet it  is hardly referred to in the 
preceding analysis.  
 
The principal arguments in Lowe 
                                                 
14 [1973] QB 702, at 709 
The argument of counsel (Bell QC) for the appellant had instead opened on a 
completely different tack as follows15;  
 
Reg. v. Senior [1899] 1 Q.B. 283 is not good law since Andrews v. Director of Public 
Prosecutions [1937] A.C. 576 . Therefore, if the defendant was guilty of wilful neglect, 
the jury had to find reckless negligence before convicting him of manslaughter. 
 
The point about Andrews v DPP, which was reiterated several times in counsel’s 
argument,  was of course that  commission of the  statutory offence of dangerous driving 
did not automatically result  in manslaughter but required proof of the higher degree of 
negligence required at common law. Therefore the principle in Senior (that commission 
of the statutory offence of wilful neglect resulting in death was automatically 
manslaughter) also now had to be modified and thus in  the absence of gross  (reckless)  
negligence, Lowe could not be guilty. 
 
Rougier QC  for the Crown responded to this by saying16  
 
Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1937] A.C. 576 has nothing to do with this appeal. 
Negligence is not the same as neglect and still less the same as wilful neglect. In Reg. v. Buck 
and Buck (1960) 44 Cr.App.R. 213 death resulted from an illegal abortion, and that was 
manslaughter. 
 
As was recognised in Sheppard [fn], negligence and neglect are indeed two different 
concepts but Phillimore LJ at this point in the argument interjected to say  
 
                                                 
15 [1973] QB 702, 703-704 
16 [1973] QB 702, at 705 
I find it difficult to distinguish between negligence and neglect. 
 
His Lordship’s difficulty in this respect evidently continued when he came to draft his 
judgment in which he clearly equated negligence with neglect  and  accepted  counsel’s 
argument for the appellant, based on Andrews v DPP, as follows17. 
 
Mr. Bell's answer is that the decision in Reg. v. Senior cannot be regarded as good law 
in the light of the unanimous decision of the House of Lords in Andrews v. Director of 
Public Prosecutions [1937] A.C. 576 . True, that case involved motor manslaughter as 
a result of neglect, but the speech of Lord Atkin is in the widest terms and is clearly 
intended to apply to every case of manslaughter by neglect.(emphasis added) 
 
The judgement then goes on to quote extensively from Andrews v DPP to  the effect 
that in such cases (i.e. cases of manslaughter by negligence/neglect) the criminal 
standard of gross (or reckless) negligence has to be proved. Immediately following the 
quotation from Andrews v DPP, Phillimore LJ then says18 
 
Now in the present case the jury negatived recklessness. How then can mere neglect, 
albeit wilful, amount to manslaughter? This court feels that there is something 
inherently unattractive in a theory of constructive manslaughter. It seems strange that 
an omission which is wilful solely in the sense that it is not inadvertent and the 
consequences of which are not in fact foreseen by the person who is neglectful should, 
if death results, automatically give rise to an indeterminate sentence instead of the 
maximum of two years which would otherwise be the limit imposed. 
 
                                                 
17 [1973] QB 702, at 708 
18 [1973] QB 702, at 709 
The judgement could perfectly logically have stopped there at the culmination of the 
analysis of, and acceptance of, the principal argument in the case (that the automatic 
manslaughter rule from Senior could not stand following Andrews v DPP). Whilst it is 
respectfully submitted that his Lordship was wrong to equate negligence with neglect 
and therefore Andrews v DPP  was arguably not directly in point, the broader point on 
which he is surely correct (which is effectively articulated when  he refers to an 
omission “which is wilful solely in the sense that it is not inadvertent and the 
consequences of which are not in fact foreseen”)  is as follows;  if an  offence does not 
even require negligence and is effectively one of strict liability (as wilful neglect had 
been interpreted in this case) there  is even less warrant (taking a broader view of the 
logic of Andrews v DPP) for its commission automatically resulting in manslaughter in 
the absence of proof of gross negligence19. 
 
Conclusions on Lowe 
Unfortunately, having accepted the principal argument of the appellant (effectively, no 
mens rea) as to why Senior, in the light of Andrews v DPP,  could no longer stand,  his 
Lordship (unnecessarily) added the paragraph already quoted above about the clear 
distinction between act and omission.  The reason for doing so is probably to be found 
in the very last almost throw away submission of counsel for the appellant20, replying 
to the Crown’s mention of cases on unlawful act manslaughter, that  
 
                                                 
19 See commentary on Andrews [2003] Crim. L.R. 477 (D.C. Ormerod) making the same point in 
relation to the unfortunate use of a strict liability offence under s 67 of the Medicines Act 1968 (on the 
facts administering insulin with consent) as the unlawful act. The case was primarily concerned with 
whether consent was a defence (it was not) and the much more appropriate potential unlawful act of 
administering a noxious thing under s.23 OAPA 1861 was left to lie on the file.  
20 [1973] QB 702, at 706 
Reg. v. Church [1966] 1 Q.B. 59 (throwing a woman into a river), Rex v. Larkin [1943] 
K.B. 174 (an attack with a razor) and Reg. v. Buck and Buck, 44 Cr.App.R. 
213 (criminal abortion) have no application to this case, which is a failure to do 
something. 
 
The most obvious response to  this would have been to say that they were all cases 
where the unlawful act was one under the OAPA 1861 and not a strict liability offence 
but  having already expressed his view that there is something unattractive in 
constructive manslaughter, Phillimore LJ simply adopted the  distinction between act 
and omission uncritically as a further reason for quashing  the manslaughter conviction. 
Given the main arguments in the case and fact that the  conviction had been based  on 
the particular rule in Senior relating to the statutory (then strict liability) offence of 
wilful neglect, rather than the more general  unlawful and dangerous act doctrine  which 
was still being clarified at the time in other cases such as Church,  Lamb 21  and 
subsequent cases, the comments about the distinction between  act and omission can 
clearly be regarded as obiter. 
 
Furthermore, there is no warrant for treating these comments as authoritatively deciding 
that an omission can never be the basis of unlawful act  manslaughter. It will be recalled 
that the paragraph quoted above contrasting act and omission concludes with the 
following sentence; 
 
If, however, I omit to do something with the result that it suffers injury to health which 
results in its death, we think that a charge of manslaughter should not be an inevitable 
consequence, even if the omission is deliberate. 
                                                 
21 [1967] 2 QB 981 
 That manslaughter is not an inevitable consequence is clearly correct (once one has 
ditched the automatic Senior rule), especially on facts such as those in Lowe where the 
omission is merely voluntary but where there  was at the time no requirement in law, 
and no finding by the jury, of any further mens rea as to  consequences. Such mens rea 
(of the unlawful act, see Lamb)  is normally a requirement of unlawful act manslaughter 
and that is the real reason why Lowe was not guilty. If the omission is not just deliberate 
but advertent i.e. the potential consequence of serious harm (or even, in principle,  some 
harm), is known to D  then, assuming he or she  has a duty to act as in the School Dinner 
example22, there is no reason why the commission by omission (under common law 
principles) of an offence under the OAPA 1861 should not be the basis for unlawful act 
manslaughter, notwithstanding that criminal  omissions under statute should not 
inevitably or automatically be so.  
 
Phillimore LJ’s instincts were undoubtedly correct in that to convict Lowe of 
manslaughter on the basis of a statutory offence not requiring (as interpreted at the time) 
any mens rea would have been to push constructive crime too far23. However  there was 
                                                 
22 The example is not at all difficult to bring into the category of situations where there is a clear duty to 
take reasonable steps to prevent the child eating the sandwich since the dangerous situation – see Miller 
[1983] 2 AC 161 - has been created by the defendant in preparing the sandwich containing the potentially 
dangerous pine nuts without a clear indication of its contents. Furthermore, D has a duty by reason of his 
or her position of responsibility for providing the children’s meals. 
 
23 Andrews [2003] Crim. L.R.  477 as has been seen, has been rightly  criticised  on this ground. 
Meeking [2012] 1 WLR 3349  is another case where the unlawful act doctrine has been too broadly 
applied to a statutory offence (s.22A(1)(b) RTA 1988) although at least in that case some degree of 
mens rea was required – an intention to interfere with the vehicle – although effectively the offence 
was one of negligence as to the danger involved where “it would be obvious to a reasonable person that 
to do so would be dangerous.” Toulson LJ, in upholding the conviction for unlawful act manslaughter, 
commented  that if the prosecution had  taken “the more natural approach of presenting the case as one 
of gross negligence manslaughter” on the facts of the case it would be “impossible to conclude that the 
jury could have come to any other verdict than guilty”.  His lordship also expressed “a possible ground 
for concern if a case which was essentially one of negligence, but arguably negligence falling short of 
gross negligence, were prosecuted by this route as form of unlawful act manslaughter.” [at para14]     
no real reason (or arguably intent) to completely exclude omissions from unlawful act 
manslaughter and in so far as his judgment has been interpreted as doing so it might be 
said to be a case of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. 
 
In summary, it is contended that in the light of the arguments before the court and 
indeed the reasoning of the Court of Appeal itself, Lowe does not totally preclude 
liability for unlawful act manslaughter based on an omission but is rather a reminder 
that statutory crimes interpreted as imposing strict liability (as well as crimes of 
negligence under Andrews v DPP) should  not be a sufficient basis for the unlawful 
act.24 Putting it another way, if Andrews v DPP lays down a rule that unlawful act 
manslaughter does not apply to acts which are only criminal because negligently 
performed, the same rule logically ought to  apply to conduct which is only criminal 
because prohibited by statute and where not even negligence is required. Thus  the 
School Dinner example (and others along the same lines)  can be brought within the 
unlawful act doctrine properly understood, without having to resort to the creation of 
(subjective) reckless manslaughter. 
 
Conclusions  
Any supposed difficulties in relation to culpable omissions causing death should 
therefore not be taken as a reason for extending manslaughter to a separate head of 
recklessness since unlawful act  manslaughter can extend to omissions in appropriate 
situations if the case of Lowe is properly understood, interpreted and distinguished. As 
                                                 
24 A frequently debated (and contested) theoretical explanation for unlawful act manslaughter has been 
the “change of normative position” that a defendant makes when choosing to commit an unlawful act 
involving mens rea.  Absent any significant advertent mens rea for the unlawful act, even the 
“moderate constructivism”, sceptically discussed by Andrew Ashworth in Chapter 5 of  Positive 
Obligations In Criminal Law, (2013) (Hart Publishing) becomes difficult to sustain.   
has been noted, Stark does not regard  the omissions  example as  central to his view 
that a separate head or offence of reckless manslaughter (in addition to the existing 
unlawful act and gross negligence varieties)  should be introduced through  statutory 
reform with consequent benefits, as he sees it,  in terms of labelling, sentencing and 
overall fairness. Whether those benefits would accrue is a larger question than can be 
adequately addressed in this article but one can certainly envisage some countervailing 
difficulties arising from reckless manslaughter that we do not currently have to deal 
with – such as those arising from the evaluative question for the jury of whether the 
perceived degree of risk 25  was a justifiable one to take which may be no less 
problematic than the question of whether negligence is sufficiently gross under the 
current law26.  There are also potential issues relating to jury unanimity27 if there are 
three rather than two heads of involuntary manslaughter. As was noted by the  Law 
Commission at para 3.57 of its 2006 Report28 “[t]he term ‘reckless’ has an unhappy 
history in the context of homicide … we now believe that the law of homicide is better 
off without it.” The essential point however of this article has been to show that it is at 
                                                 
25 If in a case similar to Alliston, discussed by Freer [2018]  Crim LR 612, there were to be evidence 
that the risks of which D was aware included serious injury, would and should that be a case of 
manslaughter given there is no arguable justification for taking the risk? The jury rejected a charge of 
unlawful act manslaughter on the facts and it is questionable whether reckless manslaughter should be 
available if the case is not considered by the prosecution to be  bad enough for gross negligence.  
26 It is sometimes argued that reckless manslaughter must be the head of manslaughter relied on in 
alternative verdicts where the prosecution fail to prove the intention required for murder by malice 
aforethought since  the jury are not specifically told to consider whether in such a case there is an 
unlawful act. Neither however are they asked to consider whether D realised there was a risk of serious 
injury or death which was unjustifiable in the circumstances to run. The natural assumption in these 
cases is that there is an unlawful act although no doubt it should be open to D to raise the issue that 
absent malice aforethought, his act was not unlawful. It is difficult however, as Stark’s article shows,  
to envisage situations where D is reckless but there is no unlawful act. 
27 See Taylor, Jury Unanimity in Homicide, 2001 Crim LR 283 and H H Judge David Clark, Jury 
Unanimity – A Practitioner’s Problem, 2001 Crim LR 301. The Law Commission also devoted an 
Appendix to the problem in their Consultation Paper No 177 (2005), A New Homicide Act for England 
and Wales (Appendix H) where at H1 they said it was a question on which “the law must speak with 
clarity if, following the reform of the law of murder or homicide, more verdicts to choose between 
become available to the jury.” 
28 Law Commission Report No. 304 (2006), Murder Manslaughter and Infanticide 
least not needed to deal with cases of unlawful act by omission which, notwithstanding 
Lowe, can quite properly be brought within the unlawful act head of manslaughter.  
 
 
 
 
 
